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Like manned aviation, a Safety Management System (SMS) needs to be developed for 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) taking into account their unique characteristics, and the 
huge variety of different operations they can perform. Towards developing a SMS for 
unmanned aviation this paper focuses on Safety Assurance and Certification for advanced 
UAS operations. Based on the manned aviation practices and the Concepts of Operations 
(ConOps) that have been developed for UAS, this paper examines two indicative operational 
scenarios (OS) in unmanned aviation identifying the gaps in the view of the safety assurance 
and certification processes. The findings form the basis for the proposal and development of 
a new safety management framework for certain UAS operations. The examination of OS 
shows that operation-centric operational approvals as well as faster integration of UAS to the 
current airspace may be possible under certain conditions. 
I. Nomenclature 
AGL = Above Ground Level 
aircraft = refers to manned and unmanned aircraft 
C3 = Command, Control, and Communication 
ft = feet 
helicopter = refers to manned helicopter 
MSL = Mean Sea Level (height measure from sea level) 
safety = aviation safety 
UAS = refers to any kind of unmanned aircraft 
II. Introduction 
Today, some state-of-the-art UAS are being used for several reasons, serving humans in many different 
applications. UAS are being used mainly for purposes that manned aircraft used to serve. UAS operations take place 
in parts of the airspace that are less used by manned aircraft like the airspace below 500 ft above ground level (AGL). 
However, in the future UAS are expected to perform and materialize innovative ideas like urban air-taxis and 
providing first aid services in urban and remote areas just to name some. Inevitably, this will force UAS to fly in 
almost any part of the airspace both controlled and uncontrolled. UAS will gradually operate in the entire spectrum of 
the airspace and interact with the Air Traffic Control (ATC) and other traffic as well. Today, UAS are being used not 
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only for military and civil protection purposes but also for recreational and private activities. Like in manned aviation, 
a Safety Management System (SMS) needs to be developed for UAS, hereinafter referred as SMS(U), taking into 
account their unique characteristics and capabilities. 
The SMS for manned aviation consists of four components: 1. Safety Policy & Objectives, 2. Safety Risk 
Management, 3. Safety Assurance, and 4. Safety Promotion. (Ref. [19]). The European Union Aviation Safety Agency 
(EASA), defines three categories of UAS operations: 1. ‘Open’, 2. ‘Specific’, and 3. ‘Certified’. This is an operation-
driven categorization. In other countries like the United States of America (USA) and Australia similar categorizations 
are made based on the UAS characteristics and performance. The huge variety of UAS cannot be covered by a single 
developing approach for a SMS(U). For example, the Northrop Grumman Global Hawk has a maximum ferry range 
of 12,300 nautical miles and a maximum altitude of 60,000 ft. It has a maximum endurance of more than 32 hours and 
its maximum speed is 310 knots. On the other edge of the capabilities spectrum there are numerous UAS like the DJI 
Mavic 2 Pro that are available to the general public and can climb to 2,000 ft or higher and accelerate to approximately 
70 kilometers per hour. (Ref. [6]). So, the framework for a SMS(U) needs to be performance-based and operation-
oriented. 
This paper focuses on developing a framework for the ‘Safety Assurance’ component focusing on advanced UAS 
operations. Certification is considered as part of Safety Assurance. Two OS are examined in the context of unmanned 
aviation and results are extracted concerning the safety risk management. In Part VII, the Manned Aviation Legacy, 
in the domains of safety assurance and certification and also how these two aspects affect the management of safety 
risks, are outlined. Next, the Unmanned Aviation Perspective is described in Part VIII. Based on the existing literature 
on safety assurance and certification, Part IX provides the OS through which the Recommendations and Findings are 
provided in Part X. 
III. Background 
One critical aspect of manned and unmanned aviation is the airspace where operations using UAS or conventional 
aircraft take place. Today, the Air Traffic Management (ATM) infrastructure has been developed according to manned 
aviation specifics and safety standards. There is an ongoing process towards transforming the existing ATM 
capabilities into a new age of ATM that will be able to handle both manned and unmanned air traffic and at the same 
time preserving safety and efficiency. For unmanned aviation the concept of ATM is transformed to Unmanned Traffic 
Management (UTM). UTM services, concepts, infrastructure, and procedures are expected to facilitate the handling 
of UAS traffic and finally the integration of UAS to current airspace. 
The main concept of UTM is the U-Space, as described in the Single European Sky ATM Research (SESAR) 
Concept of Operations for European UTM Systems (CORUS) Concept of Operations Vol.1 (2019) (Ref. [35]). 
CORUS introduced the term Very Low Level (VLL) airspace as the airspace below the minimum safe altitudes that 
manned aircraft must remain above which are 500 ft and 1,000 ft depending on the phase of flight and the area of 
operation, respectively. (Ref. [36]). In addition, the airspace below 1,000 ft over urban areas is expected to be used 
for a new kind of operation, which is the Urban Air Mobility (UAM).  
According to Ref. [31] it has been found that ‘the Airport Shuttle and Air Taxi markets are viable, with a significant 
total available market value in the U.S. of $500 billion, for a fully unconstrained5 scenario.’ In the UK, the world-first 
electric Urban Airport is under construction and estimated to be ready not later than November 2021. (Ref. [5]). UAM 
has drawn the attention of several companies like Airbus, Boeing, Vertical Aerospace Ltd, and E-Hang to name a few, 
with some expected to make their first commercial flight by 2025. In 2019, Airbus tested for first time the CityAirbus 
which is an eVTOL6 remotely piloted aircraft capable of carrying four passengers. (Ref. [3]). In some cases, UAM is 
expected to be performed initially with at least one pilot onboard but it is envisaged to become part of the unmanned 
era of aviation soon. An indicative example is the Y6S Plus, a multi-role eVTOL aircraft which in the beginning will 
be operated by a single pilot. (Ref. [34]). Regarding UAS, amongst the huge variety of their different applications an 
indicative example is the Ambular 3.0 eVTOL emergency response aircraft which is expected to be fully autonomous 
or remotely piloted. (Ref. [33]). 
Based on ICAO, the Safety Assurance is mainly based on performance monitoring. The term performance refers 
to the staff, the safety systems that are in place, the procedures, and the safe performance of the system as a whole. A 
system could be a specific operation, an operator, or a critical stakeholder. What should be noted in UAS operations 
is the number of potential stakeholders (usually bigger than manned aviation) for one single operation. As the number 
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of the potential stakeholders increases the probability of system performance shortfalls also increases rendering the 
overall safety performance questionable. In addition, setting Safety Performance Indicators (SPIs) and Safety 
Performance Targets (SPTs) may differ in unmanned aviation. Compared to the SPTs and SPIs analyzed in the SMS, 
the standards of setting these metrics need to be stricter in the SMS(U). For example, in manned aviation a SPT and a 
SPI could be ‘zero mid-air collisions (MACs) during a specified time period’ and ‘number of flight rules violations 
by aircrew during the same time period’, respectively. In unmanned operations the aforementioned SPT could be the 
same and for the same example. However, the SPI should be different, meaning that in UAS operations the number 
of flight rules violations needs to be zero in order to achieve zero mid-air collisions with manned aircraft. This couple 
of SPT and SPI is also related to different mitigation strategies, crew (UAS pilots and operators) certification, 
standards, and procedures. 
Regarding Certification, there is a twofold issue. One side is the fact that the sudden advent of UAS operations did 
not allow the adequate preparation of potential RIC with the appropriate piloting skills and aviation safety culture. 
The other side is linked to the great variety of current UAS that are expected to perform and, in some cases, replace 
the respective manned aircraft operations, incorporating different levels of technology and automation. Besides the 
required aeronautical knowledge based on Ref. [25], certification should take into account the fact that Visual Line of 
Sight (VLOS) and Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) UAS flights correspond to some unique differences of how 
they might be executed and handled from the ATM and UTM services. In regard to avoiding collisions, not every 
UAS is equipped with proximity warning systems like Traffic Collision Avoidance Systems (TCAS) and Ground 
Proximity Warning Systems (GPWS). 
IV. Scope 
This paper deals with UAS not only as the flying component of unmanned operations but also with the Remote 
Pilot in Command (RIC) and the ATC services. It also, deals with operations that are conducted under the ‘Specific’ 
category regulations. The size and complexity of these UAS as well as the complexity of the respective operations 
drive the necessity to monitor and mitigate any possible safety risk, especially the risk of MAC with other manned 
aircraft (and unmanned) and the risk of hitting people on the ground or destroying properties, ground collision (GC). 
The UAS operations that are contained in the scope of this paper are related to people transportation, and 
transferring of goods in urban and rural areas. These types of operations are considered as ‘Advanced’ and may have 
the following common characteristics: 
• They will need to be conducted mostly in BVLOS conditions; 
• They will be conducted in every flight level and not only in VLL airspace; 
• They will need to interact with other manned and unmanned traffic in a great extent due to their operational 
range; 
• They will need to interact with the air traffic services when this interaction would be deemed to be necessary; 
and 
• They could pose significant danger to people on ground and on other air traffic if the respective flight 
parameters might deteriorate. 
Bearing in mind that a SMS(U) should be oriented towards minimizing the safety risks through effective 
management and providing solutions in order to simplify and facilitate the operation approval process, it could be 
derived that such a SMS(U) covers UAS operations that may pose greater safety risks than others. According to EASA, 
a UAS operator of the ‘Open’ category is not required to perform a safety risk assessment in order to take approval 
for operation. Moreover, reasons like the huge variety, the increasing rate of utilization of UAS applicable to operate 
in the ‘Open’ category, the potential stakeholders, the affected airspace, and the safety risks (in terms of frequency 
and severity) necessitate studying of the ‘Open’ category separately. So, ‘Open’ category operations are out of the 
scope of this paper. In addition, operations of the ‘Certified’ category are mainly conducted with UAS that have 
identical capabilities, airworthiness standards and safety provisions to manned aircraft, and thus are also considered 
to be out of the scope of this paper. Usually, such UAS are designed according to the Certification Standards (CS) 
used for manned aircraft. For example, the Global Hawk is designed based on the CS-25 which corresponds to a fifty-
seat airliner. (Ref. [11]). 
Finally, international UAS flights are also out of the scope of this paper because they require the collaboration 
between multiple air traffic services from different countries which may not have the required infrastructure to 
accommodate them as a result of a respective technological gap between these countries. Furthermore, till the time of 
writing no international UAS flights are being conducted and as a result there are no data that can acquired. Table 1 
shows the operations that are in the scope of this paper. 
 
Table 1 Operations in the Scope of this paper. 
Note: 
All flights performed in VMC7. 
Operating Airspace 






‘Specific’ BVLOS Yes Yes Yes, but only in VLL airspace. 
‘Specific’ with certified 
equipment on board. Yes, only for BVLOS Yes, only for BVLOS Yes, only for BVLOS 
V. Objectives 
A. Main Objective 
The main objective is to shed light on the aspects and challenges of UAS safety assurance and certification for 
advanced operations in order to provide the basis for the creation of the respective component of a SMS(U). 
B. Sub Objectives    
The paper aims at providing qualitative results by achieving the following four sub objectives: 
1) Highlighting the most critical aspects of safety assurance and certification; 
2) Compare the safety assurance and certification in manned and unmanned aviation; 
3) Analyze two operations performed with manned and unmanned aircraft and revealing the gaps that have to 
be bridged regarding to the safety assurance and certification aspects of UAS operations. 
VI. Related Work 
Despite the fact that the integration provided today is limited and under certain assumptions and conditions, 
ConOps have been formulated under the basic assumption of preserving safety through safety risk management and 
providing the procedures and the infrastructure that are needed for the execution of certain UAS operations under 
certain conditions. 
A. CORUS (EU) 
In Europe, the CORUS project has been developed by JARUS8 in collaboration with SESAR. CORUS was 
introduced in 2019, covering the regulations and the services that should be in place for VLL UAS operations. (Ref. 
[35]). It takes into consideration the existence, development where needed and the involvement of certain U-space 
stakeholders that are depicted in Fig. 1. (Ref. [36]). CORUS suggests four phases of U-space implementation starting 
from U1 to U4. This progression is linearly linked to the involvement of U-space stakeholders and the services they 
may provide and the technological advancements in the field of UAS manufacturing and digital information and data 
exchanging. U4 corresponds to the full integration phase of UAS. 
As the U-space advances towards U4, the integration of UAS expands across the airspace and finally U4 
corresponds to the full integration of UAS in the current airspace. In order to cover this giant leap from segregation 
of UAS operations to fully integrating them in the airspace, CORUS suggests three types of VLL airspace: X, Y and 
Z. Actually, these types of airspace correspond to different levels of U-space evolvement because they are linked to 
certain provisions of services required for different kind and complexity of unmanned flights. Table 2 shows the access 
requirements for the three types of airspace. (Ref. [35]). Table 2 shows that moving from X to Z type of airspace the 
UAS operations become riskier and more complex. Therefore, more mitigating measures and services need to be in 
place for the safe operation of manned and unmanned aircraft. The relation between the three types of airspace and 
the U-space phases leads, according to CORUS, to the coexistence and thus the integration of UAS operations to the 
current airspace through the integration of the X, Y and Z types to the airspace classes as known today. 
For all of the three airspace types some services are mandated and some others that are optional in X airspace 
become mandated in the Z type. Moreover, some services exist only in the corresponding U-space phase. The reason 
is that the required technology required for some services has not been developed yet. Such technological 
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improvements could be linked to the U-space services evolution and/or the UAS themselves. Indeed, in Ref. [35], it 
is noted that type Y airspace is available from U2 onwards and type Z airspace is available from U3 onwards. 
The setting of all the aforementioned parameters meaning the UAS stakeholders, service providers, types of 
airspace, different services provided, according to the type of operation and the airspace affected, leads to the 
configuration of the VLL airspace in a way that conflicts between manned and unmanned aircraft could be avoided 
and in parallel UAS could perform safe enough in order to minimize the risks for properties on ground. The services 
















Fig. 1 U-space stakeholders. 
 
Table 2 Types of airspace and their requirements for access. 
Type Access requirements 
X 
• There are few basic requirements on the operator, the pilot or the drone. 
• The pilot remains responsible for collision avoidance. 
• VLOS and EVLOS flight are easily possible. 
• Other flight modes in X require (significant) risk mitigation. 
Y 
• An approved operation plan  
• A pilot trained for Y operation  
• A remote piloting station connected to U-space  
• A drone and remote piloting station capable of position reporting when available  
Y airspaces may also have specific technical requirements attached to them 
Z 
• An approved operation plan  
• A pilot trained for Z operation and/or a compatible, connected automatic drone  
• A remote piloting station connected to U-space  
• A drone and remote piloting station capable of position reporting  
Z airspaces may also have specific technical requirements attached to them, most probably that the 






















Fig. 2 X, Y, and Z volumes. 
 
Table 3 Services available per Airspace type per U-space Phase. 
Service X Y Z 
Registration  Mandated Mandated Mandated 
e-identification  Mandated Mandated Mandated 
Geo-awareness  Mandated Mandated Mandated 
Drone Aeronautical Information Publication  Mandated Mandated Mandated 
Geo-fencing provision  Mandated Mandated* Mandated 
Incident / accident reporting  Mandated Mandated Mandated 
Weather information  Mandated Mandated Mandated 
Position report submission sub-service  Recommended Mandated* Mandated 
Tracking  Optional Mandated* Mandated 
Drone operation plan processing  Optional Mandated Mandated 
Emergency management  Optional* Mandated* Mandated 
Monitoring  Optional Mandated* Mandated 
Procedural interface with ATC  Optional+ Mandated+ Mandated 
Strategic conflict resolution  No Mandated Mandated 
Legal recording  Optional+ Mandated* Mandated 
Digital logbook  Optional+ Mandated* Mandated 
Traffic information  Optional Mandated Offered 
Geospatial information service  Optional Optional Mandated* 
Population density map  Optional Optional Mandated* 
Electromagnetic interference information  Optional Optional Mandated* 
Navigation coverage information  Optional Optional Mandated* 
Communication coverage information  Optional Optional Mandated* 
Collaborative interface with ATC  Optional+ Mandated+ Mandated 
Dynamic capacity management No Mandated* Mandated 
Tactical conflict resolution  No No Mandated 
U-space Phase  U1 U2 U3 
+ when needed    * where available 
Regarding to conflict management, CORUS suggests three layers being the following: Strategical (pre-tactical) 
de-confliction, Tactical separation provision and Collision avoidance using Detect and Avoid (DAA) systems. These 
layers are derived from practices already used in manned aviation. Indeed, all of the three are used in manned aviation 
for aircraft deconfliction. The Strategical layer is shaped by the flight plans that are filed, the Tactical layer is mainly 
an ATC function, and the Collision avoidance has the form of See and Avoid (SAA) (pilot on board) and is achieved 
through cooperative systems for separation (e.g., TCAS). The difference in unmanned aviation is that the ATC 
function is not scalable for every UAS, which would need higher levels of automation in order to receive traffic 
information timely and accurately. Furthermore, the lack of cooperative separation systems that can be compensated 
by the SAA in manned aircraft, has to be compensated by DAA systems in unmanned aircraft. DAA systems 
performance is subject to the available technology, current weather, and atmospheric conditions. 
According to Ref. [36], the Strategical layer takes place before the flight and during the planning of the UAS 
operation. Through this planning UAS are expected to avoid any airborne conflicts by choosing to operate on different 
routes and avoid entering specific areas. If what is planned cannot be followed exactly then the Tactical layer takes 
action. A major difference to the previous layer is that at this stage UAS are airborne and either operating on a VLOS 
or BVLOS environment. The core part of the Tactical layer is the assurance of the biggest possible situational 
awareness (SA) both on UAS pilots and on the traffic services that may need to be aware of certain UAS operations. 
The main objective of the Tactical provisions is to provide information to UAS operators and they in turn execute the 
required changes of flight parameters (e.g., speed, altitude, heading, etc.) providing that the relevant information has 
been received and thus avoiding possible MAC. If both the aforementioned layers fail then the collision avoidance 
rests to the airborne platforms by the use of DAA systems. Based on Ref. [36], X airspace type offers no separation 
services and all the responsibility for safe operation is with the remote pilot, Y airspace type provides strategic conflict 
resolution and the Z airspace type provides strategic and tactical conflict resolution. 
As far as emergency situations are concerned, in Ref. [36], it is stated that ‘an emergency for a drone/operator is 
an incident/accident which causes the drone to be out of control.’ From the point of view of the available services to 
UAS under an emergency situation, the U-space incorporates an Emergency Management Service (EMS). According 
to Ref. [36], EMS is intended to provide assistance to RIC and at the same time communicate any information related 
to the emergency to those who may be interested (e.g., manned aviation, other drone pilots and air traffic services). 
Finally, it should be noted that a UTM system may provide U-space services such as Emergency Management, 
only after the development of key technologies and if certain steps can be fulfilled (i.e., UAS remote identification 
(RID), tracking, monitoring and data exchange) in real or near-real time. 
B. FAA UTM ConOps (USA) 
In the USA, in 2020, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) published the UTM ConOps V2.0. Ref. [15]. In 
the context of this paper, the basic aspects of this ConOps are the Performance Authorization, Airspace Authorization, 
BVLOS operations in controlled airspace, Remote Identification, UAS Volume Reservations and Data archiving and 
access. According to Ref. [15], this ConOps ‘focuses on UTM operations below 400 ft AGL, and addresses 
increasingly complex UTM operations within and across both uncontrolled (Class G) and controlled (Classes B, C, 
D, E[surface]) airspace environments.’ Figure 3 shows the relation between airspace and services provided, as shown 
in Ref. [15]. In order to make these services available to every UAS operator and to manned aircraft if needed, the 
UTM ConOps is based on information sharing between operators. This information, according to Ref. [15], may 
include flight intent and airspace constraints.  
Regarding the UTM system participants, in the context of this paper the more critical participants or UAS 
stakeholders are considered to be the Operator, the Remote Pilot in Command, the UAS Service Suppliers (USS), UAS 
Supplemental Data Service Providers (UAS SDSPs) and the USS Network. Based on Ref. [15], USS is the means of 
helping UAS operators meet operational requirements. USS provisions cover operations planning, intent sharing, 
strategic and tactical deconfliction, conformance monitoring, Remote ID, Airspace Authorization, airspace 
management functions and management of off-nominal situations. (Ref. [15]). The UAS SDSPs provide additional 
data to perform a flight such as terrain and obstacle data, specialized weather data, surveillance and constraint 
information. Specifically, the following five elements, as listed in Ref. [15], ensure the safe execution and management 
of unmanned flights: 
1) Issuance of Performance Authorizations that ensure Operator performance requirements are met,  
2) Airspace Authorizations - required for operations in controlled airspace,  
3) Operation Planning that supports the sharing of flight intent  
4) Airspace constraint and advisory information dissemination, and 
























Fig. 3 Operational context of UTM services. 
 
Performance authorizations are basically required for operations in uncontrolled airspace. The performance 
requirements may not be the same for every operation and in every part of the uncontrolled airspace. So, different 
performance requirements may apply in order to take into account the risk of an operation, the vicinity to a habituated 
area, the complexity of an operation and other operating factors that determine the safety risk of an operation.  
In the case of controlled airspace operations, an airspace authorization is required apart from the respective 
performance authorization. Moreover, the intention of operation makes known what type of operation will take place 
and describes the exact location or for example the exact route that a UAS will follow. These data are used by the USS 
Network and the Service providers to disseminate information related to an unmanned flight that may be in progress 
and also alerts the UAS operators and/or RICs for any part of the airspace that UAS must not violate. In Ref. [15], it 
is stated that ‘UAS Volume Reservations (UVRs) may be established when activities on the ground, or in the air, 
present a potential risk to UTM safety interests. […]. UVRs are generally short in duration, have specified airspace 
boundaries, and have an established start and end times.’  
Regarding manned aircraft interaction with the UTM system, manned aircraft could participate in the UTM system 
either passively or actively and this participation is encouraged but not mandated. Ref. [15]. Passive participation 
means that manned aircraft may use information provided by the USS Network in order to increase their SA but they 
do not share their flight intent with UAS operators. One the other hand, Active participation means that manned aircraft 
share their flight intent with UAS operators and they can provide additional data regarding their operations. 
As far as the management of safety risks are concerned, UAS operators are ultimately responsible for avoiding 
any conflict between different unmanned aircraft as well as between unmanned and manned aircraft. They are also 
responsible for avoiding weather, terrain and other hazards that may impose additional safety risks to their operations. 
The deconfliction layers are basically the same to those mentioned in the CORUS document: strategic and tactical 
deconfliction and collision avoidance (MACs and GCs) based on the available technology. In particular, regarding the 
deconfliction/separation services provided in each type of airspace, in Ref. [15] it is described that in uncontrolled 
airspace (Class G) no deconfliction/separation services are provided and the operators, manned and unmanned are 
ultimately responsible for achieving the required separation. Conversely, in controlled airspace, either below or above 
400 ft AGL, deconfliction/separation services and traffic information are provided based on the complexity and the 
type of each operation. 
A critical part of unmanned operations is the RID which is also mentioned in the CORUS document. For UAS 
operations and especially for BVLOS cases RID is the means of checking the level of conformity with flight rules and 
advisories issued by the ATC. This is achieved by the RID message that each UAS may transmit. According to Ref. 
UAS are certified and receive traditional air traffic services where required. 
UAS meet established performance requirements and cooperatively separate 
through shared situational awareness. Air traffic services not provided. 
[15], the RID message may contain but not limited to, the unique identification information of a UAS and its location. 
RID information can be transmitted using the proposed methods of Direct Broadcast and Network Publishing as 
proposed by the RID Aviation Rulemaking Committee Report 2017 cited by the UTM ConOps V2.0. The difference 
between the two methods is that in Direct Broadcast data are transmitted with no particular recipient and can be 
received by everyone in the transmission range. On the other hand, in Network Publishing data are published among 
the clients of a network and no one else can access them. 
Finally, dealing with contingencies is focused not only on UAS emergencies and systems failures but also on other 
off-nominal situations. Mainly, the UAS operator is responsible to effectively deal with emergencies and maintain the 
safe operation of the UAS or safely terminate the flight if it becomes uncontrolled. The provision of necessary 
information and assistance to UAS operators (similar to CORUS) is available through the USS network with the 
involvement of the service providers and the FAA. (Ref. [15]). 
Ultimately, it is worth mentioning that service provision (usually, location and operation-oriented), SA assurance, 
oversight by the respective authorities and the ATC, where applicable, and successfully confronting contingencies and 
unexpected situations are only available through effective and timely data sharing among the UAS stakeholders. Same 
is the case in the CORUS. 
C. SORA Methodology (EU) 
The ‘Specific’ Operations Risk Assessment (SORA) methodology is developed by JARUS and describes the 
process, rules and prerequisites for conducting an operational risk assessment. This methodology is incorporated in 
the CORUS and accepted by EASA as the main tool for safety risk assessment and obtaining approval for ‘Specific’ 
category UAS operations9. 
The SORA methodology aims at assuring that the proposed operation, during its duration, will remain under 
control and conducted safely. Should part of the operation go out of control then the required mitigation measures will 
be applied in order to continuously maintaining the operation under control. In the case of losing the control of the 
operation then emergency procedures are to be applied according to the operational plan and the Emergency Response 
Plan (ERP) in particular. The SORA methodology takes into account the operating airspace in order to define how the 
respective operation will remain under control. Regarding the operating airspace, the outcome of applying the SORA 


















Fig. 4 Graphical representation of the SORA semantic model. 
 
The steps of the SORA process are shown in Fig. 5. (Ref. [8]). Initially, the intrinsic Ground Risk Class (GRC) 
needs to be determined by correlating the operational scenarios (or the most suitable for the intended operation if not 
in the list) with the characteristics of the UAS (i.e., dimensional characteristics and expected kinetic energy). The 
outcome is a value from 1 to 7 which corresponds to the initial GRC. Next, in order to determine the final GRC, the 
initial GRC is combined with three mitigation measures. All of these mitigations should be applied for determining 
 
9 UAS operators holding a Light UAS operator Certificate (LUC) are not required to perform SORA and submit an 
operational declaration. (Ref. [8]). 
the final GRC. It should be mentioned that these mitigations are basically, strategic. If the final GRC is greater than 7 








































Fig. 5 The SORA process. 
 
Next, the operator needs to determine the initial Air Risk Class (ARC). For determining the ARC, the SORA 
process takes into account the different types of airspace defined by the altitude, vicinity to an airport or heliport, 
controlled or uncontrolled, rural or urban environment, and segregated versus typical, and the risk of collision with a 
manned aircraft. The ARC is determined from ‘a’ to ‘d’ (e.g., ARC-b) meaning that the risk of a MAC is greater as 
the class advances from ARC-a to ARC-d. After the initial determination of the ARC, there is an optional step, Step 
#5, where the operator may decrease the ARC by applying strategic mitigations, only. Then the residual ARC needs 
to be determined. This happens in Step #6 where the respective Tactical Mitigation Performance Requirements 
(TMPRs) and robustness levels are correlated to each ARC. TMPR takes into account the risk of a MAC and defines 
the level of performance in avoiding a collision with a manned aircraft. The assignment for each ARC is shown in 
Table 4. (Ref. [8]). In VLOS operations the TMPR is met through the SAA function performed by the RIC. 
 




Step#10: Comprehensive safety portfolio Are 
the mitigations and objectives required by the 
SORA met with a sufficient level of 
confidence?
Step #9: Adjacent area / airspace considerations
Step #8: Identification of operational safety objectives (OSOs)
Step #7: SAIL determination
Step #6: TMPR and robustness levels
Step #5 (optional): Application of strategic mitigations to determine the final ARC
Step #4: Determination of the initial air risk cLass (ARC)
YES
Is the GRC less than or equal to 7?
Step #3: Final GRC determination
Step #2: Determination of the UAS intrinsic ground risk class (GRC)
Step #1: ConOps Description
Other process (e.g., 
category ‘certified’) or 












Conversely, in BVLOS operations, TMPRs are based on the DAA function because the RIC is not always in visual 
contact with the UAS. So, TMPRs are applied to each sub-function of the DAA, which are the following: detect, 
decide, command, execute, and feedback loop. (Ref. [8]). An indicative example is shown in Table 5 concerning the 
‘execute’ phase of DAA. (Ref. [8]). The last phase of Step #6 is determining the robustness level for TMPR/ARC 
level. The respective assurance and integrity objectives are shown in Table 6. (Ref. [8]). 
Table 5 TMPR for 'Execute' and the requirements for each TMPR level. 
 
In Step #7 the Safety Assurance and Integrity Level (SAIL) is determined. According to Ref. [8], ‘the SAIL 
represents the level of confidence that the UAS operation will remain under control.’ The SAIL can take one of the 
six values (i.e., I to VI) and is a function of the final GRC, and the residual ARC. It is assigned to a particular ConOps 
and combined with the OSOs in the context of the respective ConOps drives the level of performance and mitigation 
measures that an UAS operator should have in place. Table 7 shows the SAIL determination. (Ref. [8]). 
Next, in Step #8, the SAIL is combined with the OSOs in order to determine the level of robustness for each OSO. 
There are twenty-four recommended OSOs. However, a competent authority may develop and apply additional or 
different OSOs and thus request the respective level of performance from the UAS operator. Each OSO is 
characterized by a different level of robustness which can be Optional (O), Low (L), Medium (M) or High (H). Table 
8 shows an indicative example of three OSOs. (Ref. [8]). Table 9 shows, for a specific OSO, how the different levels 
of robustness could be achieved. (Ref. [8]). 
In Step #9, the risks that an unmanned operation could pose to adjacent areas are addressed. For this paper the 
risks addressed in this step will be considered as the responsibility of the respective adjacent UAS operator and the 
UAS operator in a certain area will have to assure that the UAS will not exceed the limits of that area. Finally, Step 
#10 closes the loop of the SORA process reassuring that the operator has in place all the required mitigations as they 
have been derived from the SORA and is able to address any other risk associated with the safe and controlled 
execution of the intended operation. 































































Table 9 OSO#1 Different robustness levels and requirements. 
 
It must be noted that the SORA methodology does not cover UAS operations of the ‘Certified’ category. Moreover, 
it covers only the safety risks that UAS operations pose to manned aircraft (e.g., MAC or loss of adequate separation) 
and to people and properties on ground. These risks are assessed and mitigated in the context of the operating airspace. 
In addition, it does not cover the risks that a UAS operation may pose to another similar operation (e.g., MAC between 
two UAS). Also, out of the scope of the SORA are the safety risks related but not limited to weather, terrain, bird 
strikes, transferring of people and carrying weapons. 
D. Civil Aviation Publication (CAP) 722 (UK) 
The Ref. [37] outlines that an operational authorization is required for ‘Specific’ category operations. Regarding 
these operations, in Ref. [37], it is stated that ‘UAS used in the ‘Specific’ category are not subject to any particular 
classification. Their technical standards are dependent on the proposed type of operation and its associated risk 
assessment.’ So, the UAS operator needs to provide a description of the intended operation and a risk assessment for 
the respective operation. If the operation is not covered by a Pre-defined Risk Assessment (PDRA)10, the operator 
must conduct a safety risk assessment according to Ref. [38]. 
In Ref. [38] it is highlighted that ‘each Safety Risk should be at a TOLERABLE and ALARP11 level to be 
acceptable to the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA).’ Ref. [38] describes the safety risk assessment as a three-stage 
procedure. These stages are the following: 1st Safety Risk Assessment Process (SRAP), 2nd Safety Risk Assurance, and 
3rd Safety Risk Summary Statement. (Ref. [38]). In Stage 2 the Ref. [38] makes provision for the Safety Risk Assurance. 
 
10 PDRA – A risk assessment that has been already conducted based on certain assumptions (e.g., typical kinetic 
energy of up to 34 kilo Joule, BVLOS, 500 ft maximum altitude, etc.) and generally expedites the operational approval. 
11 ALARP – As Low As Reasonably Practicable: The lowest achievable level in which a risk can be reduced based on 
the available resources (i.e., money, and time). Further reduction attempt leads to disproportionate spending of 
resources in relation to the actual decrease in risk. Ref. [38]. 
 
This is a self-assessment conducted by the operator that actually provides evidence and proofs how the desirable 
outcome has been achieved in Stage 1. For example, according to Ref. [38], Stage 2 describes the methodology 
followed by the operator in Stage 1. In Stage 3 the Safety Risk Summary Statement finalizes the Safety Risk 
Assessment process. This stage summarizes the Operating Safety Case in which the whole process was based. In Ref. 
[38] the safety risk is initially categorized using three escalated levels which are the Unacceptable, Review, and 
Acceptable. (Ref. [38]). The respective definitions are shown below:  
• Unacceptable – The Safety Risk is not tolerable and mitigation measures are required to reduce the Safety 
Risk to a tolerable level.  
• Review – The Safety Risk is tolerable, but only just. The risk should be reviewed with appropriate frequency 
to ensure that it remains so.  
• Acceptable – The safety Risk is tolerable and should be reviewed with appropriate frequency to ensure that 
it remains so. 
Besides the assessment of risk tolerability, the operator must provide an assessment of ALARP. Then similar to 
the SORA methodology, the UK CAA denotes that the safety mitigations applied should be assessed for their 
robustness. The operator is responsible for the defining and proving the robustness. According to Ref. [38]), robustness 
of safety mitigations is a function of Performance and Integrity. Performance is the outcome that a mitigation may 
have on a safety risk and Integrity is the assurance that this outcome will be delivered. 
As far as the collision avoidance is concerned, DAA requirements have been established as well as separation 
services that are provided by the ATC in IFR and VFR flights. As described in Ref. [37], routine BVLOS operations 
in non-segregated airspace are required to be equipped with DAA capabilities unless it can be assured that the 
operation will not pose any hazard to other aircraft. The flight rules, type of UAS and airspace class differentiate the 
level of DAA capability that should be demonstrated. Table 10 provides a summary of how separation between aircraft 
may be achieved, according to the CAP 722. 
Finally, it is worthwhile to mention the RID requirements that the UK CAA has set. RID has been established not 
only to raise SA between airspace users but also for oversight and law enforcement purposes. RID may take the form 
of Direct RID and/or Network RID. (Ref. [37]). The main difference between these RID options is the transmission of 
UAS information within a network and respective users or not. It is also highlighted that by December 2, 2021, all 
UAS operating in the ‘Specific’ category must be equipped with RID systems. 
Table 10 Collision avoidance provisions. 
 
Controlled Airspace (Classes A-E) Class G airspace 
























will be required. 
ATC separates from other traffic (although in Class 
D and E, the pilot of a conflicting VFR flight holds 
the separation responsibility). 
 
As for manned aviation, a collision avoidance 
capability is required in case the ‘normal’ separation 
provision fails. 
If the flight is conducted wholly within controlled 
airspace where the operation of a transponder is 
mandatory, then a collision avoidance capability that 
is cooperative (e.g., ACAS) would be acceptable. 
If there is any possibility that the UAS will/might 
leave controlled airspace and enter non-segregated 
Class G airspace during the flight (including in an 
emergency), then the collision avoidance capability 
must be ‘non-cooperative’, unless there are other 
airspace measures in place that would still allow a 
cooperative system to be used. 
 
Controlled Airspace (Classes A-E) Class G airspace 














will be required. 
The remote pilot is the separator for all conflicts, 
with the same responsibilities as the pilot of a 
manned aircraft. 
Any flight in  
G class: 
 
Same as VFR 
E. Avoiding Collisions 
Avoiding collisions with the terrain and collisions between UAS and manned aircraft as well as between UAS is 
the ultimate priority of the ConOps and the regulations mentioned before. Another critical aspect is the oversight in 
case of unruly UAS operators or in cases that a UAS may encounter an emergency situation. In both cases a UAS may 
be unable to comply with the flight rules for the respective airspace or the ATC instructions and thus compromising 
safety. Oversight is a part of safety assurance. Effective oversight accompanied by the ability to intervene can result 
in avoiding loss of adequate separation and finally collisions. 
Unlike manned aviation, UAS RIC may not always be to talk to the ATC or other aircraft on the radio in order to 
verify and exchange information regarding flight. At the same time every aircraft operating in a certain area need to 
be aware of other aircraft in the vicinity. The most indicative and time-wise method to increase and maintain 
everyone’s SA is flight data sharing. Data sharing promotes safety assurance and safety oversight. Even in the case of 
non-cooperative traffic, the cooperative traffic that receives data for the non-cooperative one, can make the required 
changes in flight in order to maintain adequate separation. In the case that the non-cooperative traffic does not transmit 
any data then the separation should be maintained using non-cooperative means like radar. Some indicative examples 
are shown in Table 11. Ref. [7], [26]. Regarding airspace integration cooperative and non-cooperative traffic will 
enjoy different level of integration. UAS with no detection systems (cooperative or non-cooperative) should be 
considered as non-cooperative air traffic. 
Table 11 Cooperative and Non-Cooperative systems. 
 Cooperative Non-Cooperative 
Respective Systems 
TCAS Electro-Optical (EO) Cameras 
ETCAS High Resolution Cameras 
GDL-84 ADS-B12 Datalink  Television (TV) Cameras 
GDL-88 ADS-B Datalink System  Infrared (IR) Sensors 
Lynx NGT-9000 On-board Radars  






12 ADS-B – Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast. ADS-B is defined as a system that uses GPS technology 
to determine an aircraft's location, airspeed and other data, and broadcasts that information to a network of 
transceivers, which relays the data to ATC displays. (Ref. [16]). The broadcasting aircraft as well as the receiver 
(aircraft or ATC) must be also equipped with ADS-B in order for the messages to be received and handled. 
VII. Manned Aviation Legacy 
A. Safety Assurance 
According to Ref. [19], the Safety Assurance component consists of three elements being the Safety performance 
monitoring and measurement, the Management of change, and the Continuous improvement of the SMS. While all the 
three are linked to some extent to the safety risks of an operation, they do not correspond to the same stage of an 
operation. In terms of conducting an operation (i.e., fly an aircraft for a certain purpose) the element that is mostly 
involved is the Safety performance and monitoring. The other two are not so operation-centric. Changes in the staffing 
levels of an organization, changes in the existing technology or changes in the organizational structure could require 
management and constitute factors that may affect the operation itself. For example, in a commercial airline the safety 
of a flight should not be compromised due to a change in the operating environment (e.g., the introduction of a new 
route). Regarding the Continuous improvement of the SMS, it actually answers the question of how well the other two 
elements are being implemented. Focusing on Safety performance monitoring and measurement, in Ref. [19], it is 
stated that ‘to verify the safety performance and validate the effectiveness of safety risk controls requires the use of a 
combination of internal audits and the establishment and monitoring of SPIs.’ Internal audits are performed in order 
to verify and assess the level in which regulations and procedures are followed and also to check the effectiveness of 
safety risk controls and mitigating actions. As far as the SPIs are concerned, they are interconnected to the SPTs and 
the safety objectives that are declared by an organization or an operator. In more detail, an operator sets a safety 
objective and then sets a SPT to monitor the progress towards achieving that particular safety objective. In parallel, 
there may be one or more SPIs, related to a SPT, aid to collecting data and monitoring performance. Based on SPIs, 
alert levels can be set that are linked to the level of achievement of a SPT. Alert levels can trigger actions in order to 
reach again a former achieved SPT or highlight the necessity for further actions towards achieving a SPT. Consider 
the following example: 
An airline sets the Safety Objective of achieving zero fatal accidents during all flights for a ten-year period. For a 
particular category of fatal accidents, the MACs, the same objective is set. Bearing in mind that MACs can be the 
result of 1) loss of adequate separation between conflicting aircraft, 2) delayed pilot reaction, 3) pilots not complying 
with certain procedures, 4) aggressive and/or non-standard maneuvers, just to name some, the respective SPTs are set 
which are 1) maintaining at least 1000 ft vertical separation and 15 nautical miles from other aircraft (based on Ref. 
[21]), 2) set a certain maximum reaction time, for example 3 seconds, 3) pilot incompliance with ATC instructions, 
and 4) set standard limits for every aircraft maneuver. Focusing on SPT 1 the respective SPI could be the frequency 
that the respective limits were violated in a number of 100 flights. 
Safety performance is ultimately linked to safety risk management. Setting and monitoring SPTs and SPIs trigger 
actions required for safety risk mitigation. Risk is regarded by ICAO to be a function of probability and severity. 
Probability expressed in frequency and severity expressed in the catastrophic level of the effects form the tolerability13 
of a risk. According to ICAO, the risks that fall into the Intolerable region need to be further mitigated and if further 
mitigation does not achieve to put these risks at least in the Tolerable region then the respective operation or activity 
should not continue. The main mitigation strategies that are mentioned in Ref. [19], are the following: 
1) Avoidance: The operation or activity is cancelled or avoided because the safety risk exceeds the 
benefits of continuing the activity, thereby eliminating the safety risk entirely. 
2) Reduction: The frequency of the operation or activity is reduced, or action is taken to reduce the 
magnitude of the consequences of the safety risk. 
3) Segregation: Action is taken to isolate the effects of the consequences of the safety risk or build in 
redundancy to protect against them. 
B. Certification 
In order to achieve the desired level of performance and thus maintaining flight safety aircraft and flight crew have 
to be certified. Certification assures that a minimum level of standards has been achieved and respectively the aircraft 
and the staff involved in flight execution are certified. In the EU staff certification is described in detail by EASA, in 
the USA by FAA and similar is the case around the world. For example, as described in Ref. [10], the basic theoretical 
knowledge for a Commercial Pilot License (CPL) is shown in Table 12. Respective CS apply for other staff like 
aircraft engineers and air traffic controllers.  
 
 
13 Probability expressed in frequency and valued from 1 (lowest probability) to 5 (highest probability).  
Severity expressed in terms of the catastrophic level and valued from A (catastrophic effects) to E (negligible effects). 
Table 12 CPL Theoretical Knowledge Requirements. 
Air Law Human Performance 
Aircraft General Knowledge-
Airframe/Systems/Powerplant Meteorology 
Aircraft General Knowledge-Instrumentation General Navigation 
Mass and Balance Radio Navigation 
Performance Operational Procedures 
Flight Planning and Monitoring  
 
In regard to aircraft certification, it could be considered as an add-on in the existing airworthiness. Based on the 
type of aircraft (e.g., commercial, military cargo or fighter, helicopter, etc.,) there are certain airworthiness standards 
that are applied during the design and the construction phases. Next based on the exact type of the operation, the 
operating airspace or directives that may be oriented from the operator or the authority controlling the airspace, 
additional certification may be required in order to assure that the aircraft or an aircraft system will operate as 
requested. An indicative example is the TCAS that requires certification after its installation on the aircraft and also 
certification pertain to pilots as an assurance that they know how to use it while in-flight. 
C. Performance-based Operation 
The Performance-based Operation (PBO) concept was initially introduced by ICAO in the form of Performance-
based Navigation (PBN) and was related to navigation only. As mentioned in Ref. [22], the PBN concept relies on the 
accuracy, integrity, continuity, and functionality of aircraft navigation systems and also to the relevant pilot training 
and procedural adherence. Amongst the advantages of PBN that are mentioned in Ref. [23] the most critical could be 
considered the reduce of vertical separation minima, the evolution of new routes (shorter and thus burning less fuel or 
avoiding congested areas), easier air traffic management, and the increment of aircraft that can operate in certain areas. 
Today, different rules are applied to aircraft with certain contemporary navigation performance in contrast to aircraft 
with lower navigation capabilities. Moreover, in some airspace classes there are certain navigation criteria that need 
to be fulfilled otherwise the operation may not be approved. Regarding the advantages of PBN, in Ref. [12], it is 
mentioned that PBN can result in greater level of safety, capacity, and efficiency through the optimization of the air 
traffic routes and instrument approaches. 
Like navigation, collision avoidance is another aspect of PBO. Collision avoidance systems like TCAS have 
become mandatory aircraft equipment in most national airspaces. In the EU, all commercial aircraft must be equipped 
with TCAS although different procedures may be followed in the event that system becomes inoperable. Yet, there 
are aircraft without TCAS like many military and general aviation aircraft. Indeed, according to Ref. [20], a manned 
aircraft weighing less than 5,700 kg or carrying less than 19 passengers does not need to be equipped with TCAS. In 
addition, there may be parts of an airspace where the use of a transponder is mandatory (Mandatory Transponder 
Zones). In the future, similar mandatory zones may be created like mandatory ADS-B zones. 
Inferentially, the PBO concept results in aircraft being able or unable to operate in certain environments and when 
they do operate different rules may be applied in comparison to other less capable aircraft. This could be assumed as 
a type of segregation (performance-based) considering that an operation may not be approved or be amended due to 
performance factors. 
VIII. Unmanned Aviation Perspective 
A. UAS Certification 
Based on the research in which this paper is based, it seems that no international CS exist for the ‘Specific’ category 
UAS. Countries develop standards on a case-by-case concept that is the kind of operation each UAS is intended for. 
Below the case of the EU and the USA are briefly described.  
1) EU 
Currently, the certification of unmanned aircraft that is conducted according to the respective manned aircraft 
standards, is for the certification of UAS that are used for operations falling into the ‘Certified’ category. This 
certification is based on the Commission Regulations14 (EU) No 748/2012, (EU) 2015/640, and No 1321/2014. (Ref. 
 
14 All the three regulations cover aircraft airworthiness rules and specifications. 
[8]). According to the same rules the ‘Specific’ category UAS need an operational authorization and a risk assessment 
in order to commence operations. Certification of certain aircraft systems and other products installed in these UAS 
serve only the purpose of further risk mitigation. In this case, certification is an additional assurance that the system 
will operate safely. Regarding certification standards, based on Ref. [11] the use of manned aircraft CS is accepted 
and some ‘Special Conditions’ (SC) that request additional attention and thus development of CS could be the 
following: 
• Emergency Recovery Capability 
• Command and Control Link 
• Level of Autonomy 
• Human Machine Interface 
• Control station 
• Due to type of operation 
• System Safety Assessment 
In March 2021, EASA published guidelines related to ‘Design Verification’ for UAS operations that are classified 
based on the SORA, as SAIL III and IV. According to Ref. [9], for UAS operations assessed as SAIL V & VI EASA 
will issue type-certificate or restricted type-certificate according to the Commission Regulation No 748/2012 and for 
UAS operations assessed as SAIL III & IV EASA will perform a design verification covering one or more of the 
following topics: 1. the full design of the UAS, 2. the mitigation means linked with the design, and 3. the enhanced 
containment function. It should be noted that in Ref. [9] it is pointed out that EASA is competent to perform the 
aforementioned verification while the member states are competent to assess the competency of those remote pilots 
that will get involved in the UAS operations SAIL III & IV.     
2) USA 
The Part 107 of the 14th Code of Federal Regulation covers the operations and the respective airworthiness 
standards of the UAS weighing less than 55 pounds (approximately 25 kg), categorized as small UAS (sUAS). Part 
107 prohibits sUAS operations at night and operations over people. FAA (2016). Recently, on April 2021, FAA 
published the ‘Operations Over People rule’. (Ref. [13]). According to that rule, sUAS under the Part 107 may operate 
at night, over people and from moving vehicles. Mainly, according to the ‘Operations Over People rule’, the sUAS 
category is further divided into four categories. The rule is performance-based and takes into account the total energy 
that will be released upon impact of a sUAS on the ground or on people. For bigger UAS, FAA also applies CS similar 
to those applied on manned aircraft. 
B. Remote Pilot Training 
In terms of aircraft handling and executing basic aviating tasks like takeoff, approach, and landing as well as 
navigating inside the airspace, a remote pilot training could not be much different than the respective training of a 
manned aircraft pilot. According to Ref. [24], remote pilots shall be trained and licensed in accordance with Annex 
115 and the licensing and training requirements will be similar to those of manned aviation and will include both the 
aeronautical knowledge and operational components. Table 13 shows some basic competencies that a remote pilot 
should have as described in Ref. [25]. Today, what should be added is the skill of maintaining high SA for other 
aircraft, manned and unmanned, in the vicinity of the operating airspace. Apart from skill, this is also a technology-
driven ability that needs to be provided to the RIC. Nevertheless, remote pilots should be also trained in this activity. 
Table 13 Remote Pilot Competencies. 
Subjects of knowledge Practical skills 
Air law; Recognize and manage threats and errors; 
RPAS general knowledge; Operate the RPA within its limitations or those limitations imposed by regulation; 
Flight performance, planning, and loading; Complete all maneuvers with smoothness and accuracy; 
Human performance; Exercise good judgement and airmanship; 
Meteorology; Apply aeronautical knowledge; and 
 
15 Annex 1 – The ICAO Annex about Personnel Licensing. 
Subjects of knowledge Practical skills 
Navigation; 
Maintain control of the RPA at all times in a manner 
such that the successful outcome of a procedure or 
maneuver is assured. 
Operational procedures; 
 Principles of flight; and 
Radiotelephony. 
 
Taking into consideration that the RIC is not onboard but in a different location from the UAS and especially, in 
BVLOS operations pilot and aircraft can be separated by hundreds or thousands of miles, it is critical that human-
machine interface (HMI) can provide the RIC with all the necessary data to perform the required tasks timely and 
accurately. UAS incorporate high level of automation oriented towards making the operations easier to be conducted 
and more efficient. However, the fact that automation may not always perform as intended must be considered. The 
work mentioned in Ref. [17], highlights that HMI must keep the UAS operator informed at all times about the 
automation’s behavior and its intent. This work focuses on operating multiple UAS by a single operator but in terms 
of HMI design, it could be applied to single UAS operations. 
Moreover, HMI must be at such a sophisticated level to prevent RIC from spending excessive time in performing 
basic piloting activities. Aviate, navigate, and communicate (not necessarily through voice) can be considered as basic 
piloting activities. So, HMI should facilitate the execution of these activities and also provide the means for performing 
effectively the main mission/operation for which the UAS took off in the first place. This could be achieved with 
controls that are easy to operate like sensors and other onboard devices. Furthermore, any data and information need 
to be easily accessible and readable. The level of HMI complexity increases linearly with the type of UAS. Smaller 
UAS are often controlled using remote controls in comparison to bigger UAS that are controlled by a Ground Control 
Station (GCS). In every case, the level of training shall be equivalent to the level of UAS complexity (GCS is included 
because it constitutes part of the UAS) and the complexity of the intended operations. 
Although training is critical, there are no provisions for realistic RIC training. What is known in the manned 
aviation for its advantages is using flight simulators for the pilot training. While in bigger UAS may be provided with 
flight simulators like in the case of Predator16 training device, as shown in Ref. [32], for smaller UAS performing 
missions like inspections, fire-fighting, package delivery, etc., flight simulators are not provided, probably because 
















Fig. 6 A model of the responsibilities of a UAS pilot. 
 
16 Predator - General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Inc. (GA-ASI) MQ-9 Predator UAS. 
‘NASA's MQ-9 Ikhana Predator B had a wingspan of 66 ft and is 36 ft long, and a payload capability of greater than 
400 pounds. Ikhana was powered by a Honeywell TPE 331-10T turbo-prop engine and could reach altitudes above 
40,000 ft.’ (Ref. [30]).  
C. UAS Performance-based Concept 
As in manned aviation, PBO concepts are implemented in UAS operations too. Such concepts are applied almost 
in every kind of unmanned operation. UAS with the size, complexity, and cost of a manned aircraft, as well as, UAS 
that are smaller, relatively less complex, and may be used for recreational purposes should perform in a certain way 
in order to be eligible for operational approval. As already mentioned, UAS encompasses state of the art technology. 
One of the reasons could be the lack of pilot onboard, which necessitates UAS to perform almost perfect with minor 
deficiencies that in their majority would not affect flight safety. Application of PBO concepts is also a way to assure 
that the desired safety level will not be downgraded. 
In line with PBO concepts, FAA formulate the basis of operational approval on the ‘Performance Authorization’ 
and ‘Airspace Authorization’ with the latter not being mandatory for operations in uncontrolled airspace. (Ref. [15]). 
The equipment requirements that are set by the FAA assures not only the desired level of performance but also the 
desired level of safety performance. So, it could be substantiated that PBO is a way of safety risk mitigation and the 
greater level of the required performance could mean a greater level of safety assurance. 
D. Safety Assurance and Operation Approval 
1) Safety Barriers 
According to Ref. [19], the factors ‘Regulations’, ‘Training’, and ‘Technology’, are considered as factors that 
could drift an operation from its ideal performance (Baseline) to a more realistic one (Operational), see Fig. 7. Safety 
is maintained as long as performance is maintained between these states and the aforementioned factors work as Safety 
Barriers (SB). In the previous version of Ref. [19], these factors were considered as defenses that could impede 
accidents from happening, in an ideal situation. In real life, breaching all of these defenses or SB could lead to an 
accident. As already mentioned, ICAO suggests the mitigation strategies (MS) of Avoidance, Reduction, and 
Segregation. 
In this paper, the distinct difference between SB and MS is that SB are mainly determined in an organizational 
level and applied well before the execution of an operation. On the other hand, MS are mainly applied shortly before 
the execution of an operation or even while the operation is being performed. For example, instant application of a 
Regulation is not possible. However, an instant directive not to violate a certain part of the airspace is possible and, in 
this case, it is a form of Segregation. Another way to translate MS is that when the risk of an activity needs to be 
diminished or degraded in terms of lowering the respective probability, then a possible solution is to invest in 
technology (e.g., use a better and more accurate system to perform an activity, or use TCAS in the case of MACs, 
etc.).  
Considering the case of UAS, it is evident that technology for example, is widely used as a way of mitigation. The 
same applies for training and regulations. From the perspective of the oversight authorities and the authorities 
approving an operation, SB are used as mitigation barriers too. In addition, due to the fact that technology advances 
really quick, SB are also used as safety assurance measures. An indicative example is the FAA that requests certain 
performance level in order to issue Performance Authorization for UAS operations. Setting specific standards is not 













Fig. 7 The Practical drift Concept. 
Assessing the risk of an operator’s point of view has the following characteristics, more or less similar to manned 
aviation. Considering a hypothetic scenario of an approved UAS operation, the following data could be assumed: 
Firstly, the three SB are considered as factors that cannot be changed instantly (e.g., regulating instantly a new 
law). Also, the training of the RIC is already attained and the technology that is used has known advantages and 
disadvantages (e.g., a UAS with certain features). Secondly, based on the ICAO generic assessment, the risk of the 
operation is assessed as acceptable (green area). In a more detailed way, the operation valued as SAIL II (SORA 
process) or in the FAA context, the operation attained a ‘Performance Authorization’. However, an accident did occur. 
Similar to that scenario is the accident of a UAS that hit the ground after GPS-compass error. According to Ref. 
[2], the UAS after the error occurrence reverted from automated flight mode to manual flight mode. The pilot did not 
recognize the situation timely and the UAS went BVLOS, started descending until the time it hit the ground. The 
report mentions that the pilot was not required to be trained for emergency situations. In this accident the MS were in 
place (approval was granted). However, all the SB were breached. Technology did not work properly, Regulation for 
emergency training did not exist, and Training (the required one) did not exist too. 
2) Main Similarities and Differences of CORUS and FAA ConOps 
The main similarities are based on the fact that both ConOps use a performance-based concept for risk mitigation 
and allow UAS operation in both uncontrolled and controlled airspace. According to Ref. [29], an important similarity 
is that both ConOps use the mitigation layer concept of Strategic (pre-flight), Tactical, and Collision Avoidance in 
order to assure enough separation between aircraft. Moreover, data sharing (including flight data and operational 
intent) and cooperativeness are common between CORUS and FAA. Especially, the Strategic and Tactical 
deconfliction layers are based on data sharing. Also, cooperativeness is based on a form of data sharing because aircraft 
equipped with cooperative systems of separation need to exchange flight navigation data (e.g., altitude, airspeed, 
position, heading, rate of climb or descent) in order for such systems to work. Another important similarity is the RID 
that both ConOps consider as a way of significantly increasing the SA of UAS operators, manned aircraft pilots 
provided that they are able to receive that king of information, and as a means of performing oversight of every UAS 
operation conducted. Moreover, provisions are made for managing UAS traffic that may face emergency situations. 
As far as the main differences are concerned, according to Ref. [29], in the EU a UAS operation is assessed for 
approval based on the UAS operation category (i.e., ‘Open’, ‘Specific’, and ‘Certified’) and the U-space services 
provided for that operation. In contrast, FAA does not have similar categorization and relies the operational approval 
on the performance standards that an operators shall meet. This paper considers the CORUS as more operator-oriented 
as it also provides UAS operators with the SORA process to assess and manage the safety risks linked to their 
operations. Conversely, the FAA ConOps is more authority-oriented based on the fact that the authority (FAA) not 
only provide the performance requirements but also holds the right to assess the overall risk level of an operation 
which may have met the required performance. Indeed, in the FAA ConOps there is no safety risk management tool 
like the SORA process. Moreover, the FAA describes proposals of how UAS may transmit RID and tracking 
information (i.e., ‘Direct broadcast’ and ‘Network publishing’). FAA, also describes methods of increasing SA of 
manned and unmanned aircraft by the level of manned aircraft participation in the USS network (i.e., ‘Passive’ and 
‘Active’ participation).  
3) UAS Accidents 
Apart from the aforementioned accident, in Ref. [1], a list of 59 UAS accidents from 2015 till 2019 are mentioned 
verifying the great involvement of technical failures and pilot errors. Another indicative UAS accident related to the 
technology used and the level of pilot training is reported from the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB). 
According to Ref. [4], a UAS collided with terrain after it had entered three aerodynamic stalls. From the first and the 
second stall there was sufficient altitude and the UAS self- recovered. Unlikely to the first and second, the third stall 
occurred in such an altitude that the remaining clearance with the terrain was insufficient resulting to the UAS 
collision. The pilots executed the emergency procedures promptly. However, the ATSB found that the consecutive 
aerodynamic stalls occurred due to the blockage in the pitot-static system that resulted in unreliable airspeed data 
being supplied to the autopilot. In the report, it is also mentioned that during the pre-flight checks, the pilots could 
have identified the erroneous airspeed indications. However, they did not. 
From the aforementioned UAS occurrences the following considerations emerge: 
• The redundancy of critical UAS systems could assist to avoiding accidents due to technical failures. Systems 
linked to the UAS navigation and flight characteristics were not built with a redundancy concept. 
• The RIC training must be focused on emergency situations too. The exact description of every UAS system 
shall be documented and included in pilot training. 
• The UAS airworthiness remains the cornerstone of safety assurance. This ultimately linked to redundancy. It 
cannot be denied that in manned aviation, no aircraft during flight tests, entering consecutive aerodynamic 
stalls for any reason could achieve an airworthiness certification. 
4) Critical Aspects 
The three most critical factors affecting UAS safety assurance are the Level of Performance, Level of 
Cooperativeness, and the RIC Training. These factors are expressed through the levels of robustness and performance 
itself in the CORUS and FAA ConOps, respectively. Certification of the staff involved and the UAS based on specific 
standards aid in achieving these levels. The setting of proper and exact standards is also related to the level of 
autonomy of UAS. For example, today RIC are largely involved in controlling a UAS and perform a mission and for 
these reasons specific training is needed. The gap between current automated UAS and future autonomous UAS is 
technological. 
Cooperativeness, in terms of various systems integration into UAS, drives the necessity for certification in order 
to assure the proper function of these systems and the fact that RIC will be able to operate these systems as well. Based 
on both ConOps, the greatest level of cooperativeness, the greatest the level of safety assurance will be. Additionally, 
an aspect of cooperativeness is the participation, or not, of UAS in the U-space network (CORUS) or USS network 
(FAA). Cooperativeness should be considered not only as the exchange of data between aircraft systems (e.g., TCAS) 
but also the sharing of flight information from one UAS operator to another. EASA and FAA apply stricter rules on 
non-cooperative traffic or even a form of segregation. 
IX. Operational Scenarios 
The following scenarios investigate the transfer of people and goods delivery in VLL airspace and between 500 ft 
AGL and 8,000 ft MSL. This upper limit has been put due to the fact that above 8,000 ft MSL pressurized passenger 
cabin is mandatory. Moreover, above that flight altitude most of the are conducted under IFR conditions which are 
out of the scope pf the paper based on Table 1. Pressurized cabins and IFR flight conditions direct different level of 
safety assurance and certification and so they are considered in the following OS. 
Two types of routing are considered: 1. Over city (populated areas) and 2. Rural environment (non-populated 
areas). Missions like medical evacuation and first aid provision are not investigated. Generally, such missions are 
considered urgent so they should be subject to standing operational authorization. Both scenarios address the risks of 
MAC and GC in a BVLOS operating environment. Due to the fact that flights above 8,000 ft MSL must be performed 
by aircraft with cabin pressurization system, such UAS flights are not investigated. Further certification and safety 
assurance standards are needed for flights above that altitude. 
In regard to SPTs and SPIs, they are ultimately linked to the safety risks of an operation. Based on [27], two 
BowTie17 diagrams are provided covering the case of MACs and GCs. In these examples, UAS are considered without 
people on board. In addition, the GC BowTie diagram has formed based on the assumption that UAS is flying at low 
altitude (i.e., below 500 ft AGL). However, both examples could be used to form future SPTs and SPIs. 
A. People transfer 
1) Assumptions 
Currently, people transfer is not allowed in the ‘Specific’ category of operations. However, the scenario 
investigates the possibility of using UAS with weight below 150 kg to transfer people. The minimum number of people 
is one. This means that in the future this type of mission could be similar to private transportation using cars. The 
desired achievable probability of a MAC and GC is zero and extremely improbable, respectively. Moreover, the SORA 
process and the FAA ConOps are not structured to cover the transfer of people but they will be considered as a basis. 
2) Safety Assurance 
Regarding ground risk, based on the SORA methodology, the options of BVLOS in sparsely populated 
environment and BVLOS in populated environment are considered. Table 14 depicts the respective values of ground 
risk that needs mitigation. SORA proposes three mitigation measures (i.e., Strategic mitigation, Effects of ground 
impact are reduced, and an emergency response plan (ERP) is in place, the UAS operator is validated and effective). 
 
17 This method is described through the free BowTieXP software. (www.cgerisk.com). It provides a visualization of 
the risk assessment process. In the middle, the main hazardous event is depicted, which is linked with the hazard (at 
the top of the diagram) based on type of operation. On the left-hand side there are the threats that release/enable the 
main hazardous event to occur and on the right-hand side there are the possible consequences. Between the main 
hazard and the two sides the barriers and mitigation measures are depicted. 
All the three should be applied in order to effectively minimize the ground risk. Moreover, in the case of populated 
areas, a ground risk class has not been developed yet. Taking into consideration that the level of robustness should be 
high and based on the JARUS description of the three mitigation measures, this scenario assumes that the most critical 
factors to determine the ground risk and then minimize it are the determination of people at risk on the ground and the 
validation from a third party of the UAS performance. 
As far as the air risk is concerned, based on the SORA methodology, in this scenario, the most critical OSOs are 
considered to be the OSOs #02, 05, 06, 10, 18, and 19. Similarly to the ground risk, the desired level of robustness 
should be high. Table 15 provides an indicative example concerning the determination of the robustness level for the 
OSO #18. According to the SORA process both the level of integrity and level of assurance must be high in order to 
achieve an also high level of robustness. OSO #18 refers to UAS operations where no people are on board. However, 
in UAS operations of people transferring the Automatic protection of the flight envelope from human errors considered 
to be a necessity. 




















Table 15 OSO #18 Robustness determination. 
 
Based on the fact that operations of this scenario will be conducted without pilot on board (only people to be 
transferred), the OSO #18 is mandatory. In addition, a possible RIC may not be able to intervene and always control 
the UAS due to link continuity issues. Moreover, in the case of single human transferring, it is unlikely that everyone 
may be a pilot or have piloting background. These considerations lead to the conclusion that the level of autonomy 
needs to be raised. Another important aspect is that designing standards for UAS performing such operations are not 
defined yet, at least in a worldwide basis. These standards will define the expected target level of safety and thus the 
required SPIs and SPTs. 
In regard to C3 link, similarly to the OSO #06 (C3 link characteristics), an OSO needs to be developed to cover 
the event of C3 lost procedures. Factors affecting the performance of a link are the transaction expiration time, the 
availability, the continuity, and the integrity. (Ref. [8]). Altitude is a parameter that seriously affects the link 
performance, especially its continuity. Indeed, in urban flight environment the case of loss of Line of Sight (LOS) is 
considerable due to the existence of buildings that differentiate largely on their height. Loss of LOS may cause link 
interruption between RIC (or ground station) and the UAS itself causing loss of UAS control. On the other hand, UAS 
operations in higher altitude and in rural environment may suffer less from the loss of LOS.  
So, based on different challenges, different SPIs needs to be developed in order to monitor and measure in real 
time the link performance. In cases where link interruption is possible and may deteriorate the UAS operation, the use 
of a Link Relay Aircraft (LRA) should be considered. LRA could be used instead of satellites as a less expensive and 
more controllable option to assist UAS operators in assuring the link performance and at the same time assist 
competent authorities (e.g., CAAs) in monitoring the link performance of the UAS operating in a certain area and 
issue any required advisory. 
About MACs, the scenario considers the cooperativeness between different traffic to be essential for achieving 
timely and adequate separation. The safety layers described in both CORUS and FAA ConOps may be adequate. 
However, they rely on the fact that information and data relevant to each flight are disseminated and shared to other 
UAS operators as well. In the event of conflicting with a non-cooperative traffic, the safety assurance cannot be 
achieved, at least at the desired level for this scenario. For non-cooperative traffic, the remote ID and the sharing of 
certain flight data and operation intent with the USS or USSP may provide a level of deconfliction. The question is 
how reliable these data are and how fast they can be processed and provided to the relevant UAS operators. 
Finally, the safety of the people on board needs to be examined from the aspect of ground procedures. For example, 
where would UAS transferring people operate from? How people may be assisted to enter the UAS, sit and tight their 
seatbelts? Similar are the considerations for the disembarkation of people.  
3) Certification 
For the certification of UAS performing people transferring relevant standards should be developed that do not 
exist at the time of writing. Referring to UAS under 150 kg, weight is probably the most critical factor related to 
certification. The reason for this is that such UAS needs to be certified accordingly in order to achieve the desired 
level of safety which in this scenario is similar to that of manned aviation people transferring. That level of safety 
requests certain systems to be installed on the aircraft for traffic and ground collision avoidance. The algorithm that 
controls and directs the evasive maneuver in an imminent impact should be considered in terms of the operating 
environment (i.e., city or rural). Over cities and in VLL there is less airspace available to execute a maneuver than in 
rural areas and above 500 ft AGL. For UAS operating in, but not limited to, VLL, algorithms of traffic collision 
avoidance need to take into account the existence of slow-moving aircraft and helicopters. 
Concerning the certification of RIC, as long as the required standards have been developed and the relevant training 
is applied tailored to the specificities of each UAS, the desired level of safety could be attained. 
From an ATC perspective, safety assurance is achieved as long as oversight and performance monitoring systems 
are in place. Due to the huge number of future UAS served as air-taxis and the already big amount of UAS operators, 
the development of such systems would assist in maintain safety. Oversight and Performance monitoring regions 
(OPRs), like Flight Information Region (FIR) in manned aviation, should be developed. Parts of the U-space that are 
not certified as OPR should not permit the execution of complex operations with increased level of safety target. 
4) Developing SPTs and SPIs for OS-A 
Based on the ‘Threats’ depicted in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9, SPTs can be developed for UAS operation. Additional 
‘Threats’ could be added or new could be developed based on each operation specificities. Similarly, the respective 
SPIs are formed. For example, for the Threat related to on board systems failures (last threat of Fig. 9), a SPT could 
be to decrease the number of failures of a certain UAS systems (e.g., GPS, flight control system, C3 link, etc.). Next, 
possible SPIs could be the frequency of a certain system failure (e.g., number of GPS failures or degraded performance 
during a 100 flight-hour period. 
Taking as a reference the OSOs mentioned in the SORA methodology, a UAS operator shall develop the respective 
set of SPT and SPI. This will enhance the operation performance monitoring and thus will add to its safety assurance. 
The level of UAS autonomy may drive the development of different set of SPT and SPI or update the existing. 
Indeed, the level of technology and automation may result to a decreased frequency of UAS systems failures. 
Moreover, high level automation may provide the UAS operators with the ability to perform effective oversight of 
their UAS operations, monitoring UAS performance, and intervene when it is deemed necessary. In order to streamline 
the performance of UAS, SPIs need to be monitored during the execution of a flight.  
 

















































B. Goods delivery 
1) Assumptions 
In the Easy Access Rules for UAS (2020), the carriage of dangerous goods is one of the UAS operations contained 
in the ‘Certified’ category. In parallel, the ‘Specific’ category does not exclude the transferring of goods. This scenario 
assumes that UAS carry a maximum weight that corresponds to 25% of its Maximum Takeoff Weight (MTOW). 
Generally, the scenario deals with small package delivery, mail delivery, and single purchased items. Additionally, 
the carried items are contained in the UAS or in the case they are hanged underneath the UAS main part, items do not 
impede the aerodynamic stability and thus the entire flight performance of the UAS is not affected. The desired 
achievable probability of a MAC and GC is zero and improbable, respectively. Basically, the SORA process is used. 
2) Safety Assurance 
Regarding ground risk, the same considerations with OS-A concerning the level of population apply to this 
scenario too. Moreover, OS-B could materialize in routings where no population exist. In that case the values of Table 
14 need to be updated and particularly the respective values for no populated routings and even less populated areas 
could be lower than those depicted. The aforementioned mitigation measures can be applied. Selection of the landing 
site is a factor affecting safety assurance and certification. In case of a remote landing site, safety can be easily assured 
using standards similar to manned aviation landing sites. However, UAS conducting such kind of delivery are expected 
to deliver products in the same location to the location of the buyer (e.g., a house or a property). The concern that 
arises is that OS-B operations should be conducted only if the buyer’s landing site is available and certified. Currently, 
such standards have not been developed. Moreover, the procedural part of offloading a package must be fully 
automated due to the fact that it is not possible to train every human how to handle a particular UAS. 
As far as the air risk, the risk of MACs, and the risk C3 link loss are concerned, the same considerations of OS-A 
are applicable to OS-B too. 
3) Certification 
For this scenario, the certification considerations of OS-A are also applicable. In addition, specific certification is 
needed in line with the different types of package drop-off. UAS may either land and the package received by the 
buyer or the UAS may hover and release the package from a certain altitude using a parachute or similar technique to 
safely arrive on the ground. These certification aspects should be couple with the people (potential buyer) training to 
receive goods by using UAS. Moreover, wind characteristics is also an aspect that needs to be considered. In case 
packages are carried outside of the main airframe of a UAS, increased wind velocities may hinder the aerodynamic 
stability of UAS. 
4) Developing SPTs and SPIs for OS-B 
The considerations mentioned in ‘Developing SPTs and SPIs for OS-A’ are also applicable to OS-B. Moreover, 
in terms of ‘Consequences’, based on the aforementioned accidents and the assumption that in case of a GC the total 
energy will be fatal to people who may get hit, the respective risk probability must be zeroized. The severity of a GC 
cannot be realistically minimized to zero, so the only way of mitigation is to avoid the accident itself. Like manned 
aircraft, UAS may collide to the ground for several reasons. At least for those reasons connected to UAS systems or 
parts of them, some of them being crucial for UAS performance as a flying machine, redundancy must be assured. 




















Fig. 12 GC threats (b). 
 
Fig. 13 GC consequences. 
X. Findings and Recommendations 
A. Findings 
From the comparison of safety assurance and certification in manned and unmanned aviation and the two OS of 
future UAS operations the following findings have been identified: 
1) Strategic, Tactical, and Collision avoidance techniques shall be used to mitigate safety risks in any UAS 
operation. 
2) Current technology provides techniques of ensuring separation mostly between cooperative traffic. 
3) Safety assurance in areas where cooperative and non-cooperative aircraft operate cannot be guaranteed, 
especially during off nominal situations. 
4) Data sharing and flight information exchange are the basic components of safety assurance and oversight. 
5) SA and thus effective UAS control cannot be maintained without data sharing. 
6) Off nominal situations mandate the need of data sharing. 
7) Provisions and certification for loss of C3 link procedures shall be developed. 
8) Safety assurance and certification capabilities are linearly linked to the existing UTM levels and generally to 
the existing technology and UAS performance. 
9) Certification Standards need to be developed for the upcoming UAS operations both for the design of such 
UAS and for the operation execution. 
10) The lack of safety metrics like SPTs and SPIs in UAS operations hinders effective oversight of safety 
performance and renders safety assurance less objective. 
11) System redundancy is of paramount importance for maintaining and advancing safety assurance levels. As 
technology progresses redundancy concepts of designing UAS should be widely applied. 
12) Unlike to performance, the level of systems redundancy has not been considered in any UAS ConOps so far. 
13) ATC services cannot maintain sufficient SA for every manned and unmanned traffic under their control. 
High levels of SA are only available when the relevant technology is in place and work properly. In case of 
degraded operating systems either from the UAS or the ATC side, the provision of flight information and 
other ATC directions are significantly questionable. 
14) The SORA methodology is mostly based on the procedural aspect of assuring UAS operations safety. The 
aspect of performance assurance as a means of safety assurance is clearly described by the FAA ConOps. 
B. Recommendations 
Based on the findings already mentioned, the following recommendations are made: 
1) Further division of the ‘Specific’ category of UAS operations is needed. 
2) This division could enhance the development of specific SPIs and SPTs for each type of operation. 
3) Mitigation for the risk of C3 link loss shall be developed. Currently, this safety issue could be addressed by 
using LRA instead of using satellites. 
4) Develop technology and procedures in order to achieve effective oversight and information provision for 
every UAS flying in a certain part of the airspace. 
5) The level of automation shall be taken into account during safety risk assessment. 
6) The term ‘cooperative’ shall expand to cover the fact of a UAS participating or not in a network and 
exchanges flight data with other UAS and/or manned aircraft. Like ‘cooperative’ and ‘non-cooperative’, the 
term ‘participating’ or ‘non-participating’ UAS or manned aircraft shall be established. ‘Participating’ UAS 
may receive easier operational approval in contrast to ‘non-participating’ UAS. Also, the level of 
‘participation’ needs to be taken into account in the safety risk management and assurance process. 
7) In line with the SORA process, more PDRAs needs to be developed that take into account the new 
technological improvements and thus ease the process of operational approval for UAS operations that are 
conducted in a regular basis. 
8) The concept of Network participating and the respective level of participation for data exchange, as described 
in the FAA ConOps, should be part of the safety risk assessment and operational approval process. Generally, 
as the level of Network participation increases the operation safety risk level should decrease. 
XI. Conclusion 
In conclusion, creating a SMS(U) is not expected to cover the entire unmanned aviation activities and every UAS 
type. However, it should cover the activities and the corresponding spectrum of UAS types that are intended to perform 
unmanned operations while effectively assuring the management of safety risks that are derived from the simultaneous 
operation of manned and unmanned aircraft. The fundamentals that can be easily transferred from the manned aviation 
SMS, regarding Safety Assurance and Certification aspects, need to be studied from operation-centric perspective and 
developed as to be optimized for each specific operation. This operation-centric approach leads to a proposed further 
division of the ‘Specific’ category based on indicative contemporary UAS operations in order to facilitate the 
optimization of Safety Assurance and Certification taking into account the complexity of each operation. In all the 
ConOps mentioned before, their common characteristic is the collaboration between ATM and UTM as well as the 
provision of aeronautical information to UAS operators. Increased collaboration, effective oversight of UAS 
operations, and introduction of redundancy-based UAS design concepts will significantly add to the ongoing 
endeavour of UAS full integration to current airspace. 
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